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First Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on
Environmental Law

The Litigation Process in the Development of
Environmental Law
By DAVID SIVE*

It is difficult for me to think of any honor ever conferred upon
me that is greater than the honor here today inaugurating a lecture series marking the contributions of Lloyd Garrison to the
movement and body of environmental law, of which this law
school is now one of the nation's acknowledged leaders. That is so
whether I start with my being named the most courteous boy in
the 1939 graduating class of James Madison High School in
Brooklyn, or proceed to the two Purple Hearts I received for being
wounded in World War II (on both occasions of which, I confess,
my back faced the enemy) or then go to any of the professional
items which have been cited in an introduction.
The reasons for my sentimentalism include purely personal
recollections of Lloyd Garrison, as well as those beginning close to
thirty years ago of Richard Ottinger and Nicholas Robinson. 1 I
recall of Lloyd:
A. His heartening appearances at Scenic Hudson Board meetings, some held in my office, when preparing the Scenic Hudson
appeal; 2 at one time he presented his new assistant, Al Butzel,
Copyright © 1995 Pace University School of Law; David Sive.
* This is the annotated form of the First Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on
Environmental Law at the Pace University School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the research and proofreading by Alexandra Shultz, an
editor of the School's Environmental Law Review, and of the help, by way of ideas and
comments, of his partners, David Paget and Daniel Riesel.
1. Richard Ottinger is the current Dean of Pace University School of Law and a
former Congressman from Westchester County. Nicholas Robinson is a professor of
environmental law at Pace University School of Law.
2. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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with a 1960s wild hair look, who at first frightened me some, in
the presence of some fairly conservative board members such as
Carl Carmer;
B. Lloyd accompanying Steve Duggan, Brooks Atkinson, Al Butzel, and myself on a windy, frigid wintry day, walking out on
little Stony Point to sense the awe of Storm King Mountain, in
preparation for Atkinson's expert testimony at the second round
of Federal Power Commission (FPC) hearings; and
C. My meetings with Lloyd, about three to four times each year
for a number of years, he going south along Park Avenue to his
office and I going north to mine; at some of the meetings I felt
called upon to tell him that I had been given credit for his 1965
victory and that I had always tried hard to prevent that, whereupon he would graciously assure me that my misgivings were
unfounded.
The earliest activities with Dick [Ottinger included an early
1960s walk along the West Bank of our great River, at the foot of
Hook Mountain, led by Justice William Douglas, whom my wife
Mary suggested inviting to lead us, with about forty others including David Brower, Tom Hoving, Jr., Mary, and our children. One
of my early activities with Nick [Robinson] was a joint appearance
for a few minutes on the Today Show, to examine the glamour of
environmental law and lawyers, for which we both had to be in the
Rockefeller Center studios at 4:30 A.M. to have our faces painted.
Well, all of the foregoing is really part of the sentimental side
of this appearance before you, whereas the honor conferred upon
me does require me to say more meaningful things. In trying to
discharge that assignment, I decided several weeks ago that, as
likely as any aspect of my experience of about thirty-five years of
environmental advocacy to add a little to the relevant fund of
learning, would be thoughts about litigation and the adversary
process in the development of environmental law.
I am deeply interested in that subject and do have some definite views about it. It may be ironic that Lloyd Garrison was, in
law office parlance, much more of a trusts and estates man than a
litigator. That fact, I think, had much to do with his contribution
as a litigator of the founding environmental law case. 3 Landmark
cases in many fields of law have been fashioned by practitioners
who can approach the issues with new and different perspectives
from those of specialists in the particular fields. Without any crit3. Id.
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icism of the fine firm which represented Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference before Lloyd took the appeal, thank goodness he
was not a utilities lawyer!
I begin my serious discussion with a statement I made which
has been quoted in several environmental law and policy books,
including the history of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
(SCLDF) by Tom Turner, entitled Wild by Law, 4 and Peter Borelli's Environmental Prioritiesfor the Future:5 "In no other political and social movement has litigation played such an important
and dominant role [as in the environmental movement]."6 It is
one of those points that delights its maker, because nobody can
really disprove it; hence the maker becomes an authority. Perhaps trying to prove it is equally fruitless, but that is precisely
what I now want to do.
In addition to trying to prove what I have said, I want, assuming that my first point is correct, to go to the next question: Is that
good or bad? The latter question may seem hardly a question at
all in these days of the lowest public esteem for lawyers and
courts, but I assume that even the lay public will not rest its opinions of lawyers and litigation wholly on the Los Angeles comic opera without music that dominated the media throughout 1994 and
7
1995.
Let us start with a definition of "litigation." By the term I
mean the adversary process. What is the "adversary process?" To
answer that question I always refer to a law review article by
Judge Henry Friendly entitled Some Kind of Hearing,8 written
mainly in the context of procedural due process cases such as
Goldberg v. Kelly. 9 Judge Friendly analyzed administrative
"hearings" to determine what would satisfy procedural due
process.
4. Frederic P. Sutherland, Preface to TOM TURNER, WILD BY LAW (1990).
5. PETER BORELLI, ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE (1988).
6. TURNER, supra note 4, at xiii; see also BORELLI, supra note 5, at 58.
7. People v. Simpson,

__

Cal. 3d

-

(Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 1995).

8. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
9. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process in welfare termination proceedings required notice and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
witnesses). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that disability
benefits could be terminated without prior evidentiary hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment
requires an informal hearing before an inmate is denied parole); Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that the Constitution requires
some kind of a hearing prior to the deprivation of any significant property interest);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 663-768 (2d ed. 1988).
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I do not want to discuss here the constitutional question. I
refer to the Friendly article to note the eleven procedural aspects,' 0 which he considered in his discussion of the "Elements of
a Fair Hearing." The statement of the eleven aspects constitutes
an analysis and definition of the adversary process. Judge
Friendly concludes by stating that:
In the mass justice area the Supreme Court has yielded too
readily to the notions that the adversary system is the only appropriate model and that there is only one acceptable solution to
any problem, and consequently has been too prone to indulge in
constitutional codification. There is need for experimentation,
particularly for the use of the investigative model, for empirical
studies, and for avoiding absolutes. 1
That a wholly adversary process is not constitutionally required for an administrative hearing is demonstrated by a line of
cases beginning with Buttrey v. U.S.,12 holding that the United
States Army Corps of Engineers satisfied procedural due process
in section 404 Clean Water Act proceedings.' 3 The procedures
were "paper hearing procedures, with an informal face-to-face
meeting,"' 4 not "trial-type procedures, with oral cross-examina15
tion of witnesses."
Returning to the history of environmental law, beginning
with Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission (Scenic Hudson /),16 the earliest group of important
10. The aspects are:
(1) An Unbiased Tribunal;
(2) Notice of the Proposed Action and the Grounds Asserted for It;
(3) An Opportunity to Present Reasons Why the Proposed Action Should
Not be Taken;
(4) The Right to Call Witnesses;
(5) The Right to Know the Evidence Against One;
(6) The Right to Have Decision Based Only on the Evidence Presented;
(7) Counsel;
(8) The Making of a Record;
(9) The Statement of Reasons;
(10) Public Attendance; and
(11) Judicial Review
Friendly, supra note 8, at 1279-95.
11. Id. at 1316.
12. 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
14. Id. at 1183.
15. Id.
16. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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cases were essentially judicial reviews of administrative actions,
instituted by environmental advocates, under a statutory review
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 17 Section 1
of the APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judi18
cial review thereof."
Based upon the standing doctrine of Scenic Hudson 1,19 and
expanding upon that doctrine, the early cases 20 were brought
before the enactment of the first of the major federal statutes comprising the body of modern federal environmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 21 These and other cases
were brought, and some were even determined, before the term
"environmental law" came into general use. Who first used this
term, and exactly when it was used, is probably unknown.
My fist experience with the term "environmental law" was in
the fall of 1969, at a conference held by the Conservation Foundation and funded by the Ford Foundation in Airlee House, Virginia.
It was the first gathering of the then very small number of attorneys who had participated in environmental cases. This group in17. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
19. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
20. Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (holding that local civic organizations and conservation groups had standing to
challenge a U.S. Dep't of Transportation-approved interstate highway route); Citizens
Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that resident citizen group, national conservation group and local village had standing to sue
to enjoin the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from issuing a permit to dredge and fill
the Hudson River for highway construction); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 41 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding that private citizens and conservation organizations had standing to bring suit to challenge the Transportation Secretary's authorization of federal funding for a highway through a public park); Nashville 1-40
Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921
(1968) (holding that local civic group members and residents could seek an injunction
restraining state officials from constructing an interstate highway); Izaak Walton
League of Am. v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970) (holding that a nonprofit corporation with an aesthetic, conservational and recreational interest in protecting an area, could seek to enjoin a federal agency from giving permission to defendants to extract minerals from the area); Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593
(D. Colo. 1979), affd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 889 (1972)
(holding that plaintiffs, local residents and conservation organizations had standing
to bring suit enjoining the Forest Service from harvesting timber within a national
forest contiguous to a primitive wilderness area).
21. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 2-209, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(1988).
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cluded Victor Yannocone, who brought an early DDT case 2 2 and
founded the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and myself.
The conference was held just two months after the trial court
decision in the Hudson River Expressway case. 23 The other two
persons who comprised the litigation panel of the conference were
Professor Joseph Sax of Michigan Law School, and Russel Brenneman, Esq. of New London, Connecticut, who had written a text on
legal techniques to preserve natural areas. The conference participants were mainly: (1) law school faculty who were teaching
courses in the context of Administrative Law and Natural Resources Law and referring to Scenic Hudson 124 and its new standing and "relevant factors" doctrines; (2) some consumer and
environmental activists, including Ralph Nader; and (3) officials
of the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society and the Izaak
Walton League. Perhaps the principal product of the conference,
apart from publication of the proceedings and the several papers
presented, was the creation of the Environmental Law Institute
and its Environmental Law Reporter.
We mark here and now the 2 5 th anniversary of Earth Day
1970. It was, as many of us remember and those younger probably have learned, the explosive year of the environmental movement and of environmental law and policy. I want to note some of
the events of that year, and then relate them to the early cases,
and litigation in general. In addition to the first Earth Day, 1970
witnessed:
A. The effective date, January 1, 1970, of NEPA;25
B. The creation by NEPA of the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) 26 and its appointment of a Legal Advisory Committee (LAC),2 7 whose membership included: Nick Robinson;
Joseph Sax; Professor Frank Grad of Columbia Law School; Professor Louis Jaffe of Harvard Law School; Whitney North Seymour Jr., the Committee's Chair; and myself;
22. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
23. Citzens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), affd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
24. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
25. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1988). The CEQ, among other duties, reports to the President at least once each year on the state and condition of the environment. See 42
U.S.C. § 4344 (1988).
27. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1970). This
report, announced on Apr. 30, advised the Council on a broad range of environmental
questions.
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C. The enactment of the Clean Air Act, with the first statutory
28
citizen suit provision;
D. The creation by Executive Order of the Environmental Pro29
tection Agency (EPA);
E. The creation of the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), Friends of the Earth and the Environmental Planning
Lobby of New York State;
F. A rapid expansion of the number of law schools teaching environmental law and the devotion of a number of law school review issues to the new subject of environmental law;
G. The beginnings of environmental law continuing legal education programs;
H. A profusion of lawsuits under NEPA, beginning almost im30
mediately after the January 1, 1970 date of its effectiveness;
I. The first stirrings of, and popular use of the term, "public interest law," an important aspect of which was the environmental law of the early cases, responding to the public interest in
environmental protection; and
31
J. The first reorganization by states, including New York, of
traditional conservation and fish and game departments into
more broadly chartered environmental departments.
I am no sociologist or political theorist. It takes no such expertise, however, to point out that the events of 1970 were in no
small measure owed to the drama, excitement and perhaps even
the glamour of the early cases. The early cases, including Scenic
Hudson 1,32 were all David v. Goliath affairs, brought by a few
individuals, sometimes the activist lawyers themselves, who took
roads not generally taken until a fair number of years later. The
cases manifested and represented the rebellion against the vested
interests of the regulated communities who, according to Justice
William Douglas, in his Points of Rebellion,33 and Professor
Charles A. Reich, in his The Greening of America,34 had virtually
captured their agency regulators.
One interesting aspect of the events of the late 1960s, noted
by Justice Douglas in commenting on the "captive" administrative
28. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. Exec. Order No. 11,472, 3 C.F.R. § 792 (1966-1970), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1988).
30. See, e.g., Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, 430 F.2d 1315
(5th Cir. 1970). See also infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See 1970 N.Y. Laws 140.
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
JUSTICE WILLIAM DOUGLAS, PoINTS OF REBELLION (1969).
CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
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agencies, and perhaps since forgotten by Dean Ottinger, is the
following:
The tragedies that are happening to our environment as a result
of agency actions are too numerous to list. They reach into
every State and mount in intensity as our resources diminish.
People march and protest but they are not heard. As a result,
Congressman Richard L. Ottinger of New York has recently proposed that a National Council on the Environment be created
and granted power to stay impending agency action that may
despoil the natural resources and to carry the controversy into
35
the courts or before Congress, if necessary.
Dean Ottinger's proposal was both a precursor of NEPA and a
plan for expanding judicial review of environmental administrative actions.
In Professor Reich's book, which made him a virtual folk hero
of the young in 1970, he discussed the Scenic Hudson I case 36 as
one of the early victories over the "established procedures" of various organs of government:
But these same "establishedprocedures,"which seem so impassible, may become a route to change if they are accompanied by

even a partial change of consciousness. Sometimes the liberals
have succeeded by working through structure. One example is
in conservation. For a long time, it appeared that no legal safeguards could accomplish much for conservation. The forces of
"progress" were just too powerful; the "lawful procedures" bent
with the prevailing forces. For example, the Federal Power
Commission (FPC), with jurisdiction over hydroelectric projects
on rivers, was supposed to protect conservation values, but normally ignored them. Thus, when Consolidated Edison of New
York applied to the FPC for approval of its plans to construct a
facility on the Hudson River near Storm King Mountain, the
FPC approved the facility, ignoring the pleas of conservationists
based on damage to aesthetic and historical values. The conservationists appealed to the courts; under established precedents
they should have lost. Instead, the Court of Appeals reversed the
FPC. It held that the agency should have given greater weight to
conservation values. The structure of the Corporate State gave
way to a degree, and a era of greater legal deference to conserva7
tion began.3
35. DouGLAs, supra note 33, at 88.
36. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
37. REICH, supra note 34, at 337-38 (emphasis added).
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The drama of litigation, even without the violence, sex and
race aspects of the case now receiving far wider attention than has
ever been accorded Marbury v. Madison,38 Brown v. Board of Education,39 or Roe v. Wade, 40 stems in large part from its staged combat, battle-of-wits nature. 4 1 James M. Landis, in his classic, The
Administrative Process,4 2 refers to "the issue of judicial review
43
over administrative action giving one the sense of battle."
Whatever the explanation, litigation can be as it was in the early
1970s: A powerful political instrument in the evolution of all of
the major environmental legislation. By statutes and judge made
law, "established procedure[s] ... be[came] a route to change."4
Moreover, a principal aspect of the Environmental Movement
and environmental law, on April 22, 1970 and for the twenty-five
years since-with present problems created by Justice Scalia in
the two Lujan cases 4 5-has been the standing requirement of Article III of the Federal Constitution and of certain "prudential" requirements for standing. 46 An important aspect of the political
debate has been the provision for standing, dealt with in virtually
every major federal environmental statute in its citizen suit provi47
sion, beginning with section 304 of the Clean Air Act of 1970.
More than any other factor, it is the standing of citizens to sue
based upon their representation of the public interest in environmental protection first declared in Scenic Hudson 1,48 rather than
an economic or other traditional personal interest, that has rendered litigation more important in the development of environmental law than in other bodies of law. I can prove this both
empirically and analytically.
Empirically, I would first turn to the table of cases in any case
and materials book or text of environmental law, and note the
number of cases brought by the several major environmental pub38. 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41.

People v. Simpson, _

42. JAMES M. LANDIS,
43. Id. at 136.

Cal.3d _

(Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 1995).

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

(1938).

44. REICH, supra note 34, at 337.

45. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
46. See Ass'n of Data Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (holding
that petitioners' standing to sue must be considered under the Cases and Controversies Clause of Article III of the Constitution).
47. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
48. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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lic interest law firms (EPILF), whose charter to litigate has been
their standing in court. Taking William Rodgers' Hornbook of Environmental Law 49 as one example, its Table of Cases lists fiftyfive NRDC cases, forty-eight EDF cases, seventy-nine Sierra Club
cases (brought mainly by SCLDF), and eighteen National Wildlife
Fund (NWF) cases. 5 0 It is also clear to any student or practitioner
of environmental law that the EPILF cases include a much higher
proportion of the leading cases than do those of other plaintiffs.
Add to those cases all of those brought by other individuals or
organizations, including many ad hoc groups, the standing of
whom rested upon the statutory grant of citizen standing, and one
has at least two-thirds of all of the cases in the Rodgers Table of
Cases, 5 1 or in that of any other environmental law case book or
treatise.
One may properly ask whether this proves that litigation has
been more important in the development of environmental law
than in other bodies of law. Other bodies of law have been developed in and by cases, regardless of the basis of the standing of the
plaintiffs. I do not have the means at this time to check statistically other bodies of law (since I am only now beginning, after several years' stubbornness born by Wordsworth's preaching that,
"[tihe world is too much with us" 52 to embrace the computer
world). I believe, however, that such study is not necessary.
Consider the rapid pace at which important cases under the
early major environmental statutes arose! The rate at which
NEPA, for example, was made meaningful by litigation was truly
explosive. One can safely say that no other statute has ever been
effectuated by so many cases in so short a time. In one early case
based upon NEPA and filed on February 5, 1970,53 in which the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of park land for a golf course, a
stay pending appeal was granted under Rule 8(a) of the Federal
54
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
49. WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994).
50. Id. at 909-27.

51. Id.
52. William Wordsworth, Miscellaneous Sonnet XXXIII, in THE POEMS OF WORDSWORTii 259 (Thomas Hutchinson ed., 1926).
53. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1970) (stay vacated for mootness).
54. FED. R. App. P. 8(a). After the lower court granted the stay in Texas Comm.,
the plans were abandoned and the golf course was constructed on private land. The
appeal to the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as moot because "the judgment [would]
spawn no legal consequences." 430 F.2d at 1315. See also United States v. Knippers
and Day Real Estate, 425 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1970); David Sive, Some Thoughts of an
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The first and still greatest landmark NEPA case, Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n (Calvert Cliffs),5 5 was argued on April 16, 1971 and decided on July 23,
1971. For the first time, a court was confronted with "litigation
seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural environment."56 Here, the petitioners asserted that the rules of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) failed to satisfy the strict
guidelines required under NEPA. In remanding the case, the D.C.
Circuit held that a revision in the AEC's rules was necessary in
57
order to achieve NEPA's underlying intent.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,58 the
plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the sale of oil and gas
leases. In granting the motion, the district court assessed "the relative importance of the rights asserted and the acts sought to be
enjoined, the irreparable nature of the injury allegedly flowing
from denial of preliminary relief, the probability of ultimate success or failure of the suit [and] the balancing of damages and conveniences generally." 5 9 The court of appeals affirmed, holding the
probable environmental impact of issuing such a lease was too
60
strong to warrant a reversal.
In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,6 1 the court announced the basic principle of non-degradation under the Clean Air Act of 1970.62
The EPA Administrator was enjoined from approving a state plan
that would essentially degregate the existing clean air quality because increasing pollution levels would contradict the purpose of
the Clean Air Act. 6 3 This decision was affirmed by the D.C. Court
Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
612, 649 (1970).
55. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
56. Id. at 1111.
57. Id. at 1129.
58. 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971).
59. Id. at 166 (quoting Perry v. Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (1951)). See also Ohio Oil
Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (plaintiff has the burden of proof when seeking a
preliminary injunction).
60. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). For statistical information pertaining to NEPA cases filed from 1974 through 1990, see COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 142-43 (1992). By June 30, 1975,
approximately six years after the Clean Air Act was enacted, 332 cases were completed, 54 of which the court granted similar preliminary injunctions. Id. Three hundred thirty-two cases were still pending at this time, 65 of which had motions to
enjoin the defendant's activity. Id. at 143.
61. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
63. 344 F. Supp. at 256. For an in depth discussion of the Clean Air Act of 1970,
see S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1970).
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of Appeals on November 1, 1972,64 and re-affirmed by an equally
divided Supreme Court on June 11, 1973.65
One can turn to any of the other major environmental acts
and document the rapidity with which the laws were interpreted
and effectuated by the cases, primarily brought by public interest
plaintiffs. Many other examples could be cited of the virtually explosive rate at which the cases developed environmental law in
the 1970s. In A Retreat From JudicialActivism: The Seventh Circuit and the Environment,6 6 Professor Robert L. Glicksman describes and explains the rapid expansion of environmental law in
the 1970s as follows:
The spate of federal environmental legislation enacted in the
late 1960's and early 1970's provided a fertile breeding ground
for litigation. The federal courts reacted to the resultingproliferation of lawsuits by aggressivelypromoting the new, pro-environ-

mental legislative objectives. They lowered the barriers to
private litigants' access to the federal courts, subjected administrative agencies to procedural requirements not always apparent on the face of applicable legislation, interpreted
environmental laws expansively and used common law to fill
statutory gaps, and engaged in rigorous review of the substantive merit of agency decisions which seemed to give insufficient
67
weight to legislatively sanctioned environmental values.
At a later point he states that, "[t]he roots of judicial activism
in environmental litigation lay in social attitudes toward environmental problems prevailing among the American public in the late
1960s."68 That judicial activism was brought about by "[tihe relaxation of standing requirements for judicial review of agency actions involving environmental issues... [which] began when the
courts held that a plaintiff need not prove injury to a personal economic interest to satisfy the 'case' or 'controversy' requirement of
Article III of the Constitution." 69 My additional point is that the
early cases and judicial activism brought about the social activ64. 2 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656 (1972). The court affirmed and held
that to approve such a plan would allow the current air quality to drastically diminish. Id.

65. 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
66. Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat from JudicialActivism: The Seventh Circuit
and the Environment, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 209 (1987).
67. Id. at 209 (emphasis added). The main focus of this article is on the passive
role the courts have taken in implementing environmental laws.
68. Id. at 214.
69. Id. at 219.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/12

12

2002]

DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

739

ism, as never before in the development of any other body of public
law, fully as much as the converse. Which was the hen and which
the egg is unimportant.
At the "roots of judicial activism in environmental litigation,"70 described by Glicksman, were NRDC et al. How and why
was such a uniquely important role in the development of environmental law, by litigation, played by them? Consider first the mission of NRDC, born out of the Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference; of EDF, born out of the DDT controversy and Rachel
Carson's Silent Spring;71 and of SCLDF, born out of the Grand
Canyon Dams controversy and the resultant withdrawal of the tax
deductibility of contributions to the Sierra Club itself. The raison
d'etre of each was the development of the law, not the advancement
of the personal interests of the individuals whom they represented
or upon whose membership they rested their clients' standing.
These public interest environmental groups had, of course, to
satisfy the standing requirements of: (1) a personal stake of themselves, their members or of other plaintiffs in any controversy
which they chose to bring to court constituting the injury in fact;
(2) the traceability of the injury to the action challenged; (3) the
redressability of the injury by the relief sought; and (4) the inclusion of the interest they claim was injured in the zone of interests
of the statute which it was claimed was violated. 72 As long as
these requirements have been satisfied, however, these groups
have had the power to choose when and where to litigate.
Public interest groups have not been required to accept a passive role, as does the ordinary attorney who responds to a client.
They have been their own clients or been in a position to represent
clients whose particular interests are in accordance with their
mission. Moreover, they have been able to choose the proceeding
to bring on the basis of the sheer importance of the issues, the
probability of success and a number of other factors including,
within certain limits, the possible political consequences. All of
this never existed before in the development of any other body of
law.
Subject to their overall financial means, the groups have not
been bound by the financial considerations with respect to each
70. Id. at 214.
71. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
72. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472-75 (1981) (holding that plaintiffs did not have
standing due to a lack of injury in fact).
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particular action, as must the more traditional attorney. They
must operate within their general budgets and means when choosing the types of and particular proceedings to bring. These choices
have been based in part upon the ability to secure the greatest
impact on the developing law without being bogged down in long
and expensive trials.
The ability of NRDC, EDF, and SCLDF to develop the law
under the major environmental statutes has been remarkable.
Avoiding long trials and other factual hearings, their major cases
have generally been comparatively inexpensive. I emphasize the
word "comparatively," because the issues of law as well as of fact
may be multitudinous and complex in any litigation. The fair
value of services of the attorneys involved and their support staffs
may be high, regardless of the nature of the issues, legal or factual
or the nature or structure of the proceedings.
It is nevertheless axiomatic that the litigation of issues of law
is far less expensive than that of issues of fact. In the latter case
the expenses of depositions, trials, and other factual hearings can
rapidly accumulate, at the rate of several thousand dollars per
day, to tens and hundreds of thousands. Much of the important
law has been developed in statutory review proceedings before
courts of appeal, 73 in which there has been no fact finding, or in
district court actions reviewing informal agency action, in which
the courts have been limited to the administrative record. The
groups' statutory review practice, much of which consists of challenges to EPA regulations, has resulted in a vast body of law. This
comparative simplicity and inexpensiveness have appreciably accelerated the pace at which the major statutes have been interpreted.
Another aspect of environmental litigation that has accelerated the development of the law (and thus increased substantially
the extent to which the law, at any given point in time, has been
created by litigation) is the frequency of preliminary injunction
motions. Many of the important cases have been decisions on preliminary injunction motions or appeals therefrom.7 4 Whether the
injunctions were granted or denied, the cases, an example of

73. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167
(D.D.C. 1971); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1972).
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which was the Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 75
proceeded to early disposition. Early in environmental cases, the
rule was established that the undertaking as security for a preliminary injunction might be in a nominal amount because requiring
a bond in the usual amount would be tantamount to denying
76
standing to a plaintiff.
Still another feature of any consideration and appraisal of the
importance of litigation in the development of environmental law
is that of the extent to which that body of law is part of the common law. In this connection most of us are familiar with the
teaching of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,77 that there is no federal
common law of water pollution. There is, on the other hand, a
federal common law which developed under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER78
CLA or Superfund).
As to contribution, under CERCLA, among potentially responsible parties, for example, a specific list of factors to be applied in what was, and still is, referred to as the "Gore Amendment," was dropped in the final language of § 113(f)(1). The language could hardly vest more importance and authority in the
litigation process than it does. "In resolving contribution claims"
under § 113(f)(1), the court "may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate." 79 What is "equitable" and "appropriate" in tort
law is stated in section 433 (among other sections) of the Restatement Second of Torts,8 0 and is also found in other sources of tort
8
law. 1
Much of the law of hazardous and toxic substances is tort law.
Many environmental law professors have in recent years resumed
75. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970). In that case a preliminary injunction was denied,
but the defendants, pursuant to the Court of Appeals' request, agreed to stay construction until after trial, expediting the proceedings. Id.
76. See Friends of the Earth v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
77. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
78. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA) §§ 101-405, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 42
U.S.C.§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See, e.g., CERCLA § 107 (addressing liability under the Act).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (1965).

81. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 49, at 764, 768-90; GNB Battery Technologies,
Inc. v. Gould, 65 F.2d 615 (1995); Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas
Distribution Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (1992); In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc. v. Becker, 94

B.R. 924 (1989).
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or commenced teaching torts, and most of the attorneys and
judges involved in Superfund and toxic tort cases have searched
for, and if lucky found, their law school notes on Rylands v.
Fletcher.8 2 In doing so they have become experts on liability without fault and legal causation as between joint tortfeasors.
A chapter of the law of torts, especially the common law of
nuisance, is also the subject of a significant portion of any environmental law casebook or text. Rodgers, in his introduction to Chapter 2, entitled "Common Law and the Variations," states:
Environmental law as it is known today is an amalgam of common law and statutory principles. The impact of technology on
humans has contributed in no small way to doctrinal developments in nuisance, trespass, negligence and strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities83

All of this leads me to return to the prior statement of mine
which I quoted at the outset: That litigation has been more important in the development of environmental law than in any other
body of public law.8 4 I think that I have demonstrated it. To do so

is the simpler of the two tasks I have assumed in order to merit
the honor extended to me in initiating this lecture series. The
harder task is that of answering the question, "Is it good or bad?"
Is litigation and the adversary process a good means of making
law, both directly, through the very cases declaring the law, and
indirectly, by influencing the political processes out of which the
legislation evolves?
In any attempt to answer the question, it is important first to
broaden and deepen it. The question of whether a considerably
more important role for litigation is good or bad may be posed generally, not simply in the field of environmental law. It necessarily
involves fundamental aspects of our system of government under
our Constitution. Just as war is too important for only the generals to manage, the place of litigation in law making is far too important to be addressed wholly or even primarily by litigators or
other lawyers and law scholars. The wisdom needed is at least
equally that of political scientists, sociologists and historians.
Turning to a non-lawyer, De Tocqueville, perhaps still the
greatest scholar of the American democracy, it has been clear
82. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1966), affd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
83. RODGERS, supra note 49, at 100 (citations omitted).
84. See supra note 5.
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since the year of his classical treatise8 5 that no nation in the world
vests as much power and importance in the judiciary and its
processes as we do. The power begins with that of the courts to
invalidate legislation for its unconstitutionality. De Tocqueville's
study preceded by about a half century the origin of the adminis86
trative process and of judicial review of administrative action.
Any abolition of such review, as distinguished from its expansion
or restriction would be, if not unconstitutional, a political impossibility.
Having rejected the scenario at one end of the spectrum,
namely that of any drastic limitation of the functions of the
judiciary, including that of judicial review of administrative
action, one must, on the other hand, accept the proposition stated
above: That lawyers, the adversary process and courts in general
are probably at their lowest level of public esteem in the history of
at least my lifetime. One must consider some curbing of the
adversary process in the development of environmental law.
Where between the two scenarios do we search for wisdom?
The question involves: (1) attitudes toward "judicial activism"
versus "strict construction;" and (2) appraisal of the adversary
process as one by which to seek sound answers to issues of law
and fact. Both matters should be considered in view of some
special aspects of environmental law making.
Let me first turn to judicial activism. In the 1980s,
highlighted perhaps by the positions taken by then Chief Justice
Burger and others, there were strong warnings of the flooding of
the courts, particularly the federal courts, with lawsuits.8 7 It was
claimed that the result of this flooding was the courts'
determinations of many questions of economic and social policy.8 8
The danger of the flooding of the courts with such problems was
indeed one of the strongest arguments against permitting citizen
suits in the environmental field.
85.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).

86. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the first federal administrative
agency in the United States, was created by Congress in 1887 as an exercise of its
Constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. See Interstate Commerce Act,
ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10301-10388 (1988)); JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10 (1938).
87. See, e.g., Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1982) (addressing
how the federal courts were drowning in litigation); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a
Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
88. Burger, supra note 87, at 275.
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Judicial activism had been defended eloquently by D.C. Court
of Appeals Judge J. Skelly Wright, four years before his Calvert
Cliffs opinion,8 9 in The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic
Society-JudicialActivism or Restraint?90 Speaking of the courts'
incapacity to legislate he stated:
But whatever one may think of the Court's attempts to mitigate
the effects of its institutional incapacities, what is clear about
these incapacities is that, where relevant, they counsel deference to the legislature but do not require it. Where the choice is
between the Court struggling alone with a social issue and the
legislature dealing with it expertly, legislative action is to be
preferred. All too often, however, the practical choice has been
between the Court doing the job as best it can and no one doing
it at all. Faced with these alternatives, the Court must assume
the legislature's responsibility. If the legislature simply cannot

or does not act to correct an unconstitutional status quo, the
Court, despite all its incapacities, must finally act to do so. For
"nature abhors a political vacuum as much as any other kind,"
and if the legislatures do not live up to their constitutional responsibilities, the Court must act to fill the vacuum. 9 1
The points made by Judge Wright were addressed to the constitutional lawmaking of the Warren Court. However, they fit
very well into the environmental lawmaking of the early cases
brought before NEPA was passed, as well as cases brought under
NEPA and the later major environmental statutes. Moreover,
each of those statutes, particularly NEPA, which has no citizen
suit provision, had to be adjudicated, since Congress did not in92
tend NEPA to be such a "papertiger."
Judge Wright distinguished the activism of the Warren Court
from that of "The Nine Old Men" 93 of the New Deal era, as follows:
There is, however, an obvious difference between the two
Courts. The Nine Old Men were trying to halt a revolution in
the role of government as a social instrument, while the Warren
Court is obviously furthering that effort. Its most significant
pronouncements have decreed change in the status quo, not its
89. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

90. J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society JudicialActivism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).

91. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
92. 449 F.2d 1114.
93. Wright, supra note 90, at 2.
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preservation. Rather than invalidate legislative efforts at social
progress, its decisions have ordered alternation of widespread
and long accepted practices, including many which had not been
legislatively sanctioned in the first place. In Professor Berle's
phrase, the Warren
Court has functioned as a "revolutionary
4
committee.

"9

I have almost always distrusted warnings about judicial activism and flooding of the courts, even though, to the extent of my
own environmental advocacy and contributions to the growth of
standing, I have felt some pangs of guilt over the extension of
standing in court from the environmental field to cases such as
those brought by fathers of Little Leaguers suing over decisionmaking on the ball fields.
My feeling has always been that the advocates of strict construction and limited access to the courts have not really been
against courts' activism and the adversary process per se, but are
against them so long as the results advanced causes which they
did not favor, such as the civil liberties and racial equality causes
served by the Warren Court 95 and environmental protection. I believe that advocates of strict construction would have a different
view if the courts could be used, in part by judicial review of administrative actions, to inhibit environmental regulation and
other governmental actions which they have deemed undesirable.
My suspicion has been confirmed by some of the bills passed
by the House of Representatives and currently being considered
by the Senate, to implement the "Contract with America" (Contract).96 Without going too deeply into detail, it appears absolutely clear that the regulatory reform bills, H.R. 102297 and H.R.
450,98 would, if they become law, open the federal courts to floods
94. Id. (quoting A. BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWER vii (1967)).
95. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); United States v. Miranda, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).

96.

REP. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA

(Ed Gillespie & Bob

Schellhas eds., 1994).

97. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This version of risk assessment legislation, which is known as the "Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995,"
passed the House of Representatives on February 28, 1995. 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8,
tbl. 9, at 45. Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) introduced his own version, known as the
"Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995," in the Senate on February 2, 1995.
When this article went to press, the Dole bill was still being considered by the Senate.
See S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8, tbl. 9, at 45.
98. H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This bill is known as the "Regulatory
Transition Act of 1995," and would establish a moratorium on regulatory rule-making
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of litigation far more onerous for courts to handle. In fact, these
bills would be far more effective in inhibiting, perhaps paralyzing,
governmental action, than any which have stemmed from the
opening up of the courts, by Scenic Hudson 9 and the citizen suit
statutes, 10 0 to environmental advocates.
I only wish that political commentator and satirist Russel
Baker would write a column about how item 9 of the Contract,
purportedly designed to "stem the endless tide of litigation," 10 1
contradicts the "regulatory reform" of item 8.102 The former is the
"loser pays," restrict-product-liability item. 10 3 The latter would
add to major rule-making affecting public-health, public safety
and the environment, as new relevant factors: (1) risk analysis
and characterization; and (2) cost/benefit analysis. 10 4 H.R. 1022
adds those factors in statutory language which renders the environmental assessment process of NEPA a childishly simple one,
by comparison. 10 5
At a recent annual environmental law course in Washington,
D.C., which I chair every February, I asked Representative David
McIntosh (R-IN), who is the intellectual leader of "regulatory reform" whether the reform under item 8 would work to increase the
volume and complexity of litigation. His answer was that it might
do so, but no more than the "loser pays" legislation under item 9
would decrease litigation.
Having pointed out, however, that the "regulatory reform" advocates now are willing to promote floods of litigation, it is only
fair that I point out that the EPA General Counsel, Jean Nelson,
Esq., at the same February conference, stated the dangers of new
floods of litigation which would issue from "regulatory reform."
Other environmental advocates have also pointed out the dangers
of hamstringing environmental regulation.
There are other aspects of the inconsistencies of both pro-environmental and anti-environmental advocates. Those inconsisactions. The bill, which is known as S. 219 in the Senate, had passed both houses of
Congress at the time this article went to press. 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8, tbl. 9, at 45.
99. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
100. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304; Clean Water Act § 505.
101. GINGRICH, supra note 96, at 11. This Contract item has been codified as the
"Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995." H.R. 956, S. 565, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995). At the time this article went to press, the bill had passed both
houses of Congress. 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8, tbl. 9, at 45.
102. GINGRICH, supra note 96, at 18.
103. Id. at 145-48.
104. Id. at 131-35.
105. See H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. tits. I & 11 (1995).
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tencies may tend to render moot any effort to either limit or
expand the adversary process in the environmental, or any other
field of regulation, by any legislation. It is highly improbable that
enough political strength could ever be assembled to move the law
either way if the political force for reform is limited to that of administrative law and political science professors, assuming that
they could agree.
Assuming, however, that there is some movement possible, by
the gradual process of influencing courts, the authors of law review articles and other critical sources of the law, the question
still remains: How valuable is the adversary process in environmental decision making? My view is that it is of great importance,
more so than in most other areas of public and private law.
To support that view requires consideration of both the administrative process and the judicial process. The first aspect involves the issues of whether the principal elements of the
adversary process, as stated by Judge Friendly, should be used by
environmental administrative agencies in their decision making.
Since courts are necessarily employing the adversary process, the
second aspect involves the question of whether the availability,
scope and depth of judicial review of administrative action should
be greater in the environmental field than in most other substantive areas of public law.
Both considerations, to my mind, raise issues concerning the
proper function of scientific and other technical (including economic) expertise. Such expertise and the delineation of its role
are, in my opinion, more important in environmental decisionmaking by administrative agencies and courts than in other fields,
for two reasons: (1) the issues of fact are generally issues of conclusions dawn from undisputed perceived facts, rather than issues
of perceived facts, as to whether one person may be telling the
truth and another deliberately or simply erroneously not telling
the truth; and (2) it is particularly important in the environmental
field that scientific and other expertise be distinguished-and doing so is often difficult line drawing-from value judgment.
I believe that cross-examining an expert on the specific factual basis and logic of his or her conclusions is more likely to be
productive, either in affirming or disproving those conclusions,
than in disproving the testimony of lay witnesses testifying as to
perceived facts. Others may disagree about this, and certainly
demonstrating that a witness is lying, rather than simply stating
an unsound opinion, is more fun for the cross examiner. But I do
21
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not think that the latter really occurs very frequently, even when
the cross examiner is F. Lee Bailey or someone else with far
greater cross-examination skills than those of merely competent
trial attorneys such as myself.
Moreover, whether the demeanor of a witness and other aspects of a witness and his or her testimony indicate he or she has
been lying or telling the truth is generally regarded as the particular province of a jury. Administrative proceedings never, and environmental civil court cases, except for hazardous waste and
toxic tort damages cases, hardly ever, involve juries.
Turning to the second aspect, that of technical expertise in
environmental proceedings, which often involved the fusion or
confusion of expertise with value judgments, I believe that no process comes close to that of direct examination and cross-examination in drawing the correct line. My first experience with such
value judgments in a case was in the second round of the Scenic
Hudson FPC proceedings, 10 6 when the value of the unbroken river
shoreline of Storm King Mountain had to be balanced against the
need of an affluent society for more power. Another example of
such value judgments would be in administrative or judicial review proceedings under the Contract's "regulatory reform" provisions, which would require EPA and other agencies to perform
risk analysis and cost benefit analysis in their environmental de10 7
cision making.
If, for example, a cost/benefit analysis is based upon the valuation of life, as it must be in some cases, does it not clarify the
issue to have that valuation exposed, dissected and weighed under
cross-examination of the analyst, whether in the administrative or
the judicial review process? In using the illustration of valuation
of life I am not speaking solely of an expert who I thought might
have valued life too little. The cross-examination might as well
demonstrate that life has been valued too much to justify a particularly stringent regulation, considering the costs of the regulation.
The function and value of non-specialist judges in reviewing
the conclusions of experts, of both the agencies themselves and of
those upon whose opinions they rely, is described by Court of Appeals Judge Patricia Wald, in a paper presented at the 1991 Bellagio Conference on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Environmental Protection
106. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d
463 (2d. Cir. 1971).
107. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
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Institutions.10 On the subject of the function of "non-specialist
judges," and the role of the environmental public interest law
firms, she says:
Although some worry that nonspecialist judges cannot understand the arcane subject matter of environmental law, for the
most part judges have proven themselves capable of mastering
its essentials in the same degree as elected legislators and
agency policy makers. In cases brought to compel the federal or
state government to act, trial courts on occasion have exercised
dramatic powers, stopping timber sales, immediately enjoining
all disposal of wastes, or barring the addition of new sewer
hookups. Such rulings have a significant effect on agency decision making, but in the absence of such judicial exercises of
power, it is difficult to see how agencies can be controlled. Fortunately,judicial oversight is possible because of the major environmental organizations that can go face to face with
government in court. Ordinary citizens rarely have the resources to conduct such litigation because of the excessive time
and money that trials and appeals consume. 10 9
If we accept the premise that scientific and other expertise,
and the delineation of its use, are of particular importance in environmental administrative and judicial decision making, we can
conclude that the adversary process is thus particularly useful.
The second aspect of the value of the adversary process, especially in the realm of environmental administrative action, is the
availability, scope, and depth of judicial review. Turning to that
subject, I confess a certain uneasiness, born of the fact that I will
be saying in much briefer form (for which I am certain everyone is
now thankful) what I stated in a Columbia Law Review Article in
April, 1970.110 I feel this uneasiness because I do not really know
whether, on the one hand, I should credit myself with some degree
of prophecy, or whether, on the other hand, I am demonstrating
that I have no or few new ideas twenty-five years later.
Whichever deduction is correct, I would point out that one of
the grounds for my taking the position in 1970, that the scope and
depth of judicial review should be greater in the environmental
field than in most others,'1 1 applies to some extent at this time. I
108. Patricia M. Wald, The Role of the Judiciary in EnvironmentalProtection, 19
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 519 (1992).
109. Id. at 545-46 (emphasis added).
110. Sive, supra note 54.
111. Id. at 614.

B.C.
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say "to some extent" but would say, "equally as much or even
more," if some version of the Contract's "regulatory reform" 1 12 becomes law. A court applies Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC (Chevron)," 3 directing the acceptance by courts of any reasonable
constructing by an agency of the statutes administered by it. Issues in the review of environmental decision-making are more frequently issues of law or mixed issues of law or fact, and less
frequently wholly issues of fact, as compared to most other fields
of public and private law. Subject to Chevron, determinations of
14
issues of law may be reviewed de novo."
Due to the relationship between environmental law and the
terms of the statutes declaring it, such as the clause in NEPA
which requires an environmental impact statement (EIS) for all
agency actions "significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, " 1 15 an issue of the application of the once new statutory term may change from one of law to one of fact. The relationship of the newness of a statutory term to the question of whether
a determination of its application is one of law or of fact is clearly
seen from Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council.1 6 The
"respondents maintain[ed] that the question for review center[ed]
on the legal meaning of the term 'significant'," 1 7 in connection
with their claim that there was a duty to supplement an environmental impact statement, because "new information suffice[d] to
establish a 'significant' effect [upon the environment]." ' 18 The Supreme Court responded that "[tihe dispute... does not turn on the
meaning of the term 'significant' or on an application of [a] legal
standard to settled facts."" 9 Rather, the Court ruled, "resolution
20
of this dispute involves primarily issues of fact."'
There is little doubt that in the early NEPA days, an issue as
to the meaning and application of the word, "significantly,"' 2 1 in
the determination of whether an impact statement is required,
would have been at least a mixed issue of law and fact. The Coun112. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
113. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As to the current status of the law of this case, see The
Supreme Court,EPA and Chevron: The Uncertain Status of Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,127 (March 1995).
114. 467 U.S. at 842-43. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
116. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
117. Id. at 376.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 377.
120. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377.
121. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1994).
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cil on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations 122 set forth a definition of some complexity, after several early cases ruled upon the
meaning. 123

In connection with the newness of statutory concepts and
terms, consider the issues of law the courts will have to face in
reviewing administrative agency applications of any new law requiring risk analysis and cost/benefit analysis. Examine, for instance, the problems of a court reviewing an EPA strategy
determination required to be based upon a cost/benefit analysis.
Perhaps, one valuing life and weighing it against the costs of
preventing death, with EPA being required to certify, among other
things:
That other alternative strategies identified or considered by the
agency were found either: (A) to be less cost-effective at achieving a substantially equivalent reduction in risk; or (B) to provide
less flexibility to state, local, or tribal governments or regulated
entities in achieving the otherwise applicable objectives of the
regulation along with a brief explanation of why alternative
strategies that were identified or considered by the agency were
12 4
found to be less cost-effective or less flexible.
The prospect of a regulated community advocate, perhaps
even (to use a more strident term) a polluter, bringing a judicial
proceeding to review an EPA rule, in which the reviewing court
would have to determine the meaning of the above quoted, Gingrich inspired, paragraph, poses a dilemma for me. On the one
hand, the broader and deeper the court review and the weaker the
Chevron-inspired presumption of reasonability of statutory interpretation accorded to EPA, the worse it may be for the environmentalists. On the other hand, I favor more intensive review in
environmental cases.
In this connection it is reasonable to anticipate that such judicial reviews would delay implementation of EPA regulations to
122. Id.
123. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973) (holding that in determining whether the erection of a jail, a major federal
action, will affect the quality of the environment, the review must determine whether
adverse environmental effects would exceed existing impacts); Louisiana Wildlife
Fed'n, Inc. v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that Army Corps of
Engineers must reconsider its assumption that 17,200 acres to be cleared and converted from wetlands to agricultural use would be cleared by landowners regardless
of a flood control project).
124. See H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a)(3) (1995).
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the point of rendering permanent the moratorium against EPA
major rulemaking of another Contract inspired "regulatory reform," H.R. 450.125 It might at least delay implementation many
more years than I, by judicial review, helped delay a case in which
I represented communities opposing the 1-287 cutting away of
whole mountainsides in the Highlands of Passaic and Bergen
126
counties of New Jersey.
Here is my second dilemma. Am I at this lecture more or less
of an administrative and environmental law teacher or student
than an environmental advocate? I think that my role here is
more the former, however difficult it is not to be overwhelmed by a
resurgence of youth, thinking back to the fun days with Dick Ottinger spreading our environmental gospel from his Volkswagen
bus.
Imagining myself again as a member of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, and discharging the function I
might thus discharge if the Contract 12 7 schedule were slowed
down to two hundred days, I continue to take the position that
broader and deeper judicial review of environmental administrative actions should be the rule. Such review is important enough
to suffer the slowing down or reversal of EPA rulemaking actions,
as well as to delay the implementation of mountainside cutting or
of U.S. Forest Service lumbering contracts.
There is still another reason, in my opinion, for more intensive review of environmental agency actions than of most other
agency actions. As described in my 1970 Columbia Law Review
effort, 128 there is legal authority for broadening and deepening judicial review in cases where a claimant of a constitutional right
came before an agency. A 1922 Supreme Court opinion by Justice
Brandeis, in a deportation case, so held.1 29 The reason was that
the right to avoid deportation was said to be "all that makes life
1 30
worth living."
Environmental rights may not always be quite in the same
category. However, if the scope and depth of judicial review are
even roughly proportionate to the relative irrevocability and im125. See supra note 101.
126. County of Bergen v. Dole, 620 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d
1130 (3d Cir. 1986).
127. GINGRICH, supra note 96.
128. Sive, supra note 54.

129. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
130. Id. at 284.
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portance of administrative determinations to be judicially reviewed, environmental determinations frequently meet the test.
This may have been more the case in the earlier years when the
cases, more frequently than today, involved projects to be built or
not built, e.g., power plants, 13 1 massive dams, 13 2 or interstate
roads. 33 It still is the case, however, that environmental decisions are generally less revocable than those in other fields of law.
134
If, for example, the "regulatory reform" of item 8 of the Contract
becomes law, the cost of death and the benefit of life will be appraised in the consideration of the cost-effectiveness of each new
regulation. 3 5 The administrative decisions may well involve for
some affected persons little short of "all that makes life worth living" for a candidate for deportation. 13 6 Stated otherwise, and with
some admitted triteness and sentimentality, excusable on this anniversary day: "There is only one Earth."

131. See supra notes 1-2, 107 and accompanying text.
132. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that the
Endangered Species Act prohibited the completion of a dam which would have either
eradicated a known population of an endangered species, the snail darter, or de-

stroyed its critical habitat).
133. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(holding that the Secretary of Transportation may not authorize funds for construction of a highway through a public park if a "feasible and prudent" alternative route
exists; and if no such route exists, construction may only be approved if there has
been "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the park).
134. GINGRICH, supra note 96, at 18.
135. Id. at 132.
136. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 284 (1922).
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